Scottish Solicitors' Discipline Tribunal

John Ross Boyle

A complaint was made by the Council of the Law Society of Scotland against John Ross Boyle, Boyles Solicitors, Dundee. The Tribunal found the respondent not guilty of professional misconduct and declined to remit the complaint to the Council under s 53ZA of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980. 

The complaint alleged that the respondent advised the secondary complainer by email on 17 May 2019 that he had lodged a recall of decree with court when he had not done so. He also advised the secondary complainer by email on 1 October 2019 that he would seek to have a court order recalled. He did not take this action. The complaint alleged that the respondent failed to take steps to protect the secondary complainer’s position, which failing, to advise him of the importance of protecting his position. In a separate paragraph, the complainers alleged that the respondent’s actions in failing to protect the secondary complainer’s position adequately, which led to the sequestration of his estate, brought the profession into disrepute. 

With regard to the email of 17 May 2019, the Tribunal accepted the respondent’s explanation that, sending a message in haste from his mobile phone, he did not intend to mislead or deceive the secondary complainer. With regard to the email of 1 October 2019, the Tribunal accepted the respondent’s explanation that he intended to have the court order recalled and overturned at the time he wrote the email, but was unable thereafter to obtain instructions. No issues of dishonesty or lack of integrity therefore arose. The Tribunal considered that the respondent had breached rule B1.4. However, in the context of the whole circumstances of the case, there was not a large degree of culpability to be attached to the respondent. 

Considering all the circumstances in context, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the respondent’s behaviour constituted a serious and reprehensible departure from the standards of competent and reputable solicitors. Therefore, the respondent was not guilty of professional misconduct. Given his explanation which was accepted, the Tribunal considered that the circumstances did not impinge on his reputation. Carelessness, incompetence, or inadequate professional service alone was insufficient to satisfy the test. Therefore, the Tribunal declined to remit the complaint under s 53ZA. 

Kenneth Whitton Gray

A complaint was made by the Council of the Law Society of Scotland against Kenneth Whitton Gray, Williams Gray Williams Ltd, Cupar. 

The Tribunal accepted the respondent’s explanation that the disposition which was the subject of the complaint had not gone for registration due to a human error caused by oversight. He had believed that the disposition had gone for registration. The relevant form for submission to Registers of Scotland had been completed but unfortunately was also punched and filed amongst the correspondence. While he could not explain precisely why he failed to notice the credit balance on the client ledger before 2015, he explained that the credit balance of £30 would not have been an alert to an unregistered deed. The Tribunal accepted that, when he noted the credit balance in 2015, he passed the information on to the relevant individual at the firm who retained possession of the file. In all the circumstances, the Tribunal found the respondent not guilty of professional misconduct. The Tribunal concluded that the conduct here did not meet the test for unsatisfactory professional conduct and therefore it was not appropriate to remit the complaint back to the Council. 

Saaima Khalid

A complaint was made by the Council of the Law Society of Scotland against Saaima Khalid, JKR Law Ltd, Glasgow. The Tribunal found the respondent not guilty of professional misconduct.

On 6 June 2018, the respondent became the sole director and shareholder of a private company limited by shares. That company was an “incorporated practice” as defined by the Law Society of Scotland Practice Rules 2011. A confirmation statement dated 5 June 2019 was lodged with Companies House. It indicated that five shares were held by the respondent, and five by another person. That other person was not qualified to be a member of the company either in terms of the Practice Rules or the company’s articles of association. The Practice Rules were breached. The complaint alleged that only the respondent, or someone authorised by her, could have permitted the transfer of shares, as she was the sole director and member at the time of the transfer. The respondent, although not present at the hearing, had lodged documents tending to show that she was not aware of the transfer, which had been undertaken by her accountant on instructions from a member of her staff. 

The onus of proof in a professional misconduct case is always on the complainers. The standard of proof applied is that beyond reasonable doubt. The benefit of any reasonable doubt must be given to the respondent. The Tribunal had a reasonable doubt about whether the respondent had known about the transfer. In those circumstances, the Tribunal considered that the degree of culpability which ought properly to be attached to the respondent was low. She was not guilty of professional misconduct. The Tribunal declined to remit the complaint to the Society for consideration of unsatisfactory professional conduct. 

Gordon William Tulloch Murphy

A complaint was made by the Council of the Law Society of Scotland against Gordon William Tulloch Murphy, solicitor, Stirling. The Tribunal found the respondent guilty of professional misconduct in respect of breach of rules B1.7.1, B1.9.1 and B2.1.7, all of the Law Society of Scotland Practice Rules 2011.

The Tribunal censured the respondent and fined him £1,500.

The respondent acted in a conflict of interest situation when he acted for both parties in relation to a minute of agreement and standard security. The secondary complainer and her son required very different advice. It was for the respondent to identify this and act. He did not explain his advice to the secondary complainer in writing. It would have been appropriate to do so in the circumstances of this case which involved an unusual transaction and a significant amount of money for the secondary complainer. The potential outcomes for the secondary complainer were serious. The respondent presented the minute of agreement to the secondary complainer’s son without informing him in writing that his signature would have legal consequences or that he should seek independent legal advice before signature. 

Solicitors must not act for two or more clients in matters where there is a conflict of interest between the clients (rule B1.7.1). Solicitors must communicate effectively (rule B1.9.1). They must not present deeds to unrepresented parties without giving them certain information in writing (rule B2.1.7). 

Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was satisfied that in cumulo, acting when the clients’ interests were in conflict, failing to communicate effectively with the secondary complainer in writing and failing to issue a letter to the secondary complainer’s son under rule B2.1.7 constituted a serious and reprehensible departure from the standards of competent and reputable solicitors. The respondent was therefore guilty of professional misconduct.

Allan Richard Morison Steele

A complaint was made by the Council of the Law Society of Scotland against Allan Richard Morison Steele, solicitor, Giffnock. The Tribunal found the respondent not guilty of professional misconduct and remitted the complaint to the Council in terms of s 53ZA of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980.

The respondent was convicted in 2016 of a contravention of s 38(1) of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010. He was found guilty of behaving in a threatening or abusive manner which was likely to cause a reasonable person fear or alarm. The criminal complaint alleged that he had behaved in an aggressive manner towards his wife and shouted abuse at her and swore at her. 

The Tribunal considered that the respondent’s conduct was undoubtedly capable of criticism and might be said to represent a departure from the standards of conduct to be expected of competent and reputable solicitors. However, it did not consider overall that such departure was serious and reprehensible. In particular, while not of itself determinative, the Tribunal did not consider that the conviction raised any question of lack of integrity.

Therefore, the Tribunal found the respondent not guilty of professional misconduct. The Tribunal considered that the respondent’s behaviour might constitute unsatisfactory professional conduct. Accordingly, the Tribunal found the respondent not guilty of professional misconduct and remitted the case to the Society under s 53ZA.