Chilcot: Government did not exhaust options before going to war

The circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action in Iraq were "far from satisfactory", according to the report of the Chilcot inquiry published today.

Sir John Chilcot's seven-year inquiry into the 2003 invasion by the USA-UK led coalition that toppled Saddam Hussein, has concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.

Further, the severity of threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was described with a certainty that was not justified, as intelligence had "not established beyond doubt" that Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.

Former Prime Minister Tony Blair, who is severely criticised in the report, is said to have overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq, and went further than the UK's "special relationship" with the US required in offering his unconditional support.

The report, which considers UK Government policy decisions between 2001 and 2009, covers the background to the decision to go to war, whether troops were properly prepared, how the conflict was conducted and the "wholly inadequate" preparations for its aftermath – a period of continuing violence which saw at least 150,000 Iraqis killed up to 2009 and another 1m displaced.

Presenting his report, Sir John described the events of March 2003 when the then Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, advised that a "reasonable case" could be made that UN resolution 1441 provided a sufficient legal basis for military action. When the military and civil service both asked for more clarity, Lord Goldsmith advised that the “better view” was that there was, on balance, a secure legal basis for military action without a further Security Council resolution. On 14 March, he asked Mr Blair to confirm that Iraq had committed further material breaches as specified in resolution 1441. Mr Blair did so the next day.

"However, the precise basis on which Mr Blair made that decision is not clear", Sir John said. "Given the gravity of the decision, Lord Goldsmith should have been asked to provide written advice explaining how, in the absence of a majority in the Security Council, Mr Blair could take that decision.

"This is one of a number of occasions identified by the inquiry when policy should have been considered by a Cabinet committee and then discussed by Cabinet itself."

On planning, Mr Blair "did not establish clear ministerial oversight of UK planning and preparation. He did not ensure that there was a flexible, realistic and fully resourced plan that integrated UK military and civilian contributions, and addressed the known risks". These failures continued to have an effect after the invasion: :The Government’s preparations failed to take account of the magnitude of the task of stabilising, administering and reconstructing Iraq, and of the responsibilities which were likely to fall to the UK... The scale of the UK effort in post-conflict Iraq never matched the scale of the challenge."

In short, "The UK military role in Iraq ended a very long way from success."

Sir John concludes that ministerial discussion which encourages frank and informed debate and challenge is important, and recommends that in future, all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged "with the utmost rigour". And decisions, when made, need to be implemented fully.

The inquiry website is at www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/